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ABSTRACT In 2018, Yang et al. proposed a decentralizedmulti-authority attribute-based encryption scheme
for cloud computing applications and proved its security using the dual system encryption technique. In this
comment, we show that Yang et al.’s scheme does not achieve encryption one-wayness under the key-only
attack and the user collusion attack, respectively. In the key-only attack, with the knowledge of public
parameters only, an adversary can impersonate the attribute authorities to forge user attribute secret keys.
In the user collusion attack, malicious users can collude by sharing their secret keys to unauthorizedly decrypt
a ciphertext. In order to fix the scheme, we suggest adopting a pairing-based proof of knowledge protocol
and the decryption algorithm from Lewko and Water’s ABE scheme.
INDEX TERMS Cryptanalysis, decentralizing, multi-authority, attribute-based encryption, dual system
encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, Yang et al. [4] designed a decentralizing multi-
authority attribute-based encryption (D-MA-ABE) scheme
for cloud computing applications. The D-MA-ABE scheme
solves the single point of failure problem in the traditional
ABE scheme and at the same time provides anonymity prop-
erty for users. The latter is achieved by setting an attribute
authority AAi to request the attribute keys from other attribute
authorities AAj on behalf of its users, if AAi does not has the
attributes needed. In such setting, when the public keys of
every AA are made public, the D-MA-ABE scheme allows
dynamic joining of AAs.
Although the security of D-MA-ABE scheme is assured
by Yang et al. using the dual system encryption technique,
we discover two security flaws in their scheme. The first flaw
occurs in the key issuing protocol which is the core engine
for the dynamic joining of AA. The protocol is represented
by the second and third processes in Figure 1 which include
the verification of requester identity and the generated secret
key. Specifically, we discover that using the knowledge of
public parameters only, an adversary can impersonate any
AAi to request the user attribute secret keys from another AAj.
In the extreme case, the flaw allows the adversary to collect all
attribute keys from the AAs and own the D-MA-ABE system
such that the adversary can decrypt any given ciphertext. This
shows that Yang et al.’s D-MA-ABE scheme does not achieve
encryption one-wayness under the key-only attack. The sec-
ond flaw resides in the ciphertext construction where by the
access control matrix is not properly bound to the secret expo-
nents. This allows malicious users to unauthorizedly decrypt
a ciphertext as their unique secret key component which
should stop them from colluding, can be cancelled out during
the decryption process. In order to fix the scheme, we suggest
to adopt a proof of knowledge protocol as well as the decryp-
tion algorithm from Lewko and Water’s ABE [2] scheme.
This comment paper is organized as follow. We briefly
describe the mathematical background related to Yang et al.’s
D-MA-ABE scheme in Section II and present the attacks in
Section III. Finally, we suggest some solutions to the attacks
in Section IV.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
A. BILINEAR MAP
Let G and GT be two distinct cyclic groups of prime order q
and let g1, g2 be the point generators in G. The bilinear map
e : G×G→ GT is said to be an admissible map if it fulfills
the following conditions:
1) Bilinearity:
- The placements of the scalar multipliers of the two
points to e does not affect the mapping result.
- Example: e(ga1, g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)ab = e(gb1, ga2) for all
a, b ∈ Zq.
2) Non-degeneracy:
- The result of the mapping is unique.
- Example: e(g1, g1) 6= e(g2, g2) 6= e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
3) Efficiently Computable: e can be easily computed
given any two points g1 and g2.
Yang et al.’s D-MA-ABE uses a variant of bilinear map,
namely, composite order bilinear map whose order q = N =
p1p2p3 is a composite number and is constructed by three
primes p1, p2, p3. We can, however, view their composite
order bilinear map the same as a prime order bilinear map
as their D-MA-ABE operates in the subgroup Gp1 only [4].
B. LINEAR SECRET SHARING SCHEME
A linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) fulfills the following
conditions:
1) The shares for each party generated a vector λ ∈ Z|λ|q .
2) There exists a matrix A of n rows and l columns which
can generate the shares. Each row i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is
labeled by a function ρ such that ρ(i) denotes the i-th
participant. Given a vector v = (s, v2, . . . , vl) ∈ Zlq
where s is the secret to be shared and v2, . . . , vl are
chosen randomly, λ = A · v = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λl) is the
vector of shares for the secret s. We can also say that
λi = Ai · v is the share of the participant ρ(i).
Given a LSSS represented by (A, ρ) as above, there exists
constants C = (c1, . . . , c|I |) ∈ Z|I |q such that s = ∑i∈I ciλi
can be reconstructed if and only if A(S) = 1 where I is the
set of rows {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}.
C. ACCESS TREE
When the threshold in LSSS is set to t out of total n,
it becomes a (t, n)-gate in which the secret can be recovered
when at least t shares are presented. We can see that if t = n,
the LSSS becomes an AND-gate; if t = 1, the LSSS becomes
an OR-gate. Combining these gates recursively, we can build
an access tree A. Given an attribute set S, A(S) = 1 if it is
satisfied by S while A(S) = 0 when it is not satisfied by S.
In order to illustrate the use of LSSS in constructing an A,
we modify the converting algorithm from [3] to efficiently
convert an access tree to a compressed Shamir’s LSSS [1]
matrix. Let u be the vector which contains the node label and
k be the counter of the branches, the converting algorithm
goes down the tree in depth-first search manner, and labels
the leaf nodes as follows:
FIGURE 1. Key Distribution Process of Yang et al.’s D-MA-ABE Scheme [4].
FIGURE 2. Converting an Access Tree to a LSSS Matrix.
1) if the current node is the root node, set u = (1), k = 0
and traverse to the left branch if there is any.
2) if the parent node is an AND gate, increment k by 1 and
concatenate it to the label followed by the index 1 ≤
i ≤ n of attributes, e.g., u = (1, k, i) where n is the
total attributes under the branch. If n > 1, increment i
and record each index in a new row.
3) if the parent node is an OR gate, increment k by 1 and
concatenate it to the label followed by the number 0,
i.e., regardless of the index 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that u =
(1, k, 0). If n > 1, duplicate the row for n times.
4) when all nodes are labeled, pad the shorter rows with
number 0 so that each row has the same length.
Considering the access tree A = {{a AND b}
AND {c OR d}} shown in Figure 2. The generated 6× 3 full
LSSSmatrix A can be simplified into a 4×3matrix to provide
only the essential information needed by the user:
A =

1 1 0
1 1 1
1 1 2
1 2 0
1 2 0
1 2 0

→left AND gate
→ ρ(1) = a
→ ρ(2) = b
→right OR gate
→ ρ(3) = c
→ ρ(4) = d
H⇒

1 1 1
1 1 2
1 2 0
1 2 0

We can compress the matrix by substituting the indexes in the
access tree with their corresponding attributes as below:
A =
1 1 a1 1 b
1 c · d 0

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This reduces the rows in A whenever there is an OR gate and
also simplifies the mapping function ρ which is now implic-
itly encoded into A as each row can be uniquely identified
using the attribute in it. Since the matrix A has l = 3 columns,
the secret vector v ∈ Zlq has 3 elements with the secret s to
be shared placed at the first. The constant ci can be calculated
from the equation:
ci =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
0− j
i− j
where S is the attribute set under the current branch while i
and j are the indexes (or attributes if compressed) in the set S.
Yang et al.’s D-MA-ABE abuses the notation in the process
of recovering s such that the recursive process is ignored [4],
as if the access tree is only a single level access tree which is
exactly a LSSS. We note that this is a common practice for
the ABE schemes described using LSSS matrices in order to
simplify the scheme description.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS
In this section, we present the key-only attack and the user
collusion attack on Yang et al.’s D-MA-ABE scheme to break
its encryption one-wayness property, respectively. Since this
is a comment paper, we do not recall the details of the D-MA-
ABE [4] scheme.
A. KEY-ONLY ATTACK
In order to ease our explanation, we consider the following
scenario. A malicious user A wants to decrypt the victim
user V’s ciphertext C . User A’s attribute secret key contains
the attributes {a, b} = {IT , admin} which are generated by
the attribute authority AA1; while user V’s attribute secret
key contains the attributes {c, d} = {finance,manager}
which are generated by the attribute authority AA2. Assuming
AA1 and AA2 handle the attributes {a, b} and {c, d} respec-
tively, and the access structure on C is set to {c AND d} =
{finance AND manager}, we explain how user A decrypts C
successfully as follow.
1) We first display the public parameters known to user A:
IDAA1 , IDa = IDAA1 ||IT , IDb = IDAA1 ||admin,
IDAA2 , IDc = IDAA2 ||finance, IDd= IDAA2 ||manager,
PKAA1 = gs1H1(IDAA1 ),
PKa = {PK ′a = e(g1, g1)s1(Hx1 (IDa)),
PK ′′a = g
Hx1(IDa)
1 },
PKb = {PK ′b = e(g1, g1)s1(Hx1 (IDb)),
PK ′′b = g
Hx1(IDb)
1 },
PKAA2 = gs2H1(IDAA2 ),
PKc = {PK ′c = e(g1, g1)s2(Hx2 (IDc)),
PK ′′c = g
Hx2(IDc)
1 },
PKd = {PK ′d = e(g1, g1)s2(Hx2 (IDd )),
PK ′′d = g
Hx2(IDd )
1 }
2) Next, from PKAA1 , user A can compute the value:
X1 =
(
gs1H1(IDAA1 )
)1/H1(IDAA1 ) = gs1
3) Using X1, User A can impersonate AA1 to request the
attribute secret key SKc,A for the attribute c = finance
from AA2 as follows:
a) User A sends H2(GID) = H2(IDAA1 ||IDA),
IDc = IDAA2 ||finance, IDAA1 to AA2, together
with CA = XH1(IDc)1 H2(GID). Note that the prefix
in IDc is not IDAA1 because the attribute c =
finance is handled by AA2.
b) AA2 accepts the request since1:
e(g1,CA)H1(IDAA1 )
= e(g1,XH1(IDc)1 H2(GID))H1(IDAA1 )
= e(g1, gs1H1(IDc)H2(GID))H1(IDAA1 )
= e(g1,PK1)H1(IDc)e(g1,H2(GID))H1(IDAA1 )
c) AA2 computes and sends
SKc,A = gs2Hx2 (IDc)1 H2(GID)Hx2 (IDc)H2(IDAA1 )
to user A who is mistaken as AA1.
4) User A repeats the same request for SKd,A using X1.
5) Given the ciphertext C as:
C0 = Me(g1, g1)s, C1,x = e(g1, g1)λx (PK ′x)rx ,
C2,x = grx1 , C3,x = grx1 gωx1 , C4,x = (PK ′′x )rxgωx1
where ω = {0, ω′}, v = {s, v′} ∈ Z2N , ωx = Ax · ω
and λx = Ax · v with A as the 2 × 2 access matrix
for x ∈ {c, d}. User A can decrypt C using SKx,A by
calculating C1,xe(H2(GID),C4,x )e(H2(ID1),C3,x )e(SKx,A,C2,x ) , as shown at
the top of the next page, to find M such that:
C0∏
x
(
e(g1, g1)λx e(H2(GID), g1)ωx e(H2(IDAA1 ), g1)ωx
)cx
= Me(g1, g1)
s
e(g1, g1)s
= M
where
∑
x cxAxv = s and
∑
x cxAxω = 0 for the
constants cx ∈ ZN .
B. COLLUSION ATTACK
In order to illustrate the collusion attack, we consider the
scenario of two malicious users A and B collude to unau-
thorizedly decrypt a ciphertext C . User A’s attribute secret
key contains the attributes {a, b} = {IT , admin} which
are generated by the attribute authority AA1; while user
B’s attribute secret key contains the attributes {c, d} =
{finance,manager} which are generated by the attribute
authority AA2. Assuming AA1 and AA2 handle the attributes
1We believe the equation in step 3 and step 5 of the key issuing protocol in
[4] has typographic errors where the value IDu at the right hand side should
be GID as IDu is not known to AA2.
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C1,xe(H2(GID),C4,x)e(H2(ID1),C3,x)
e(SKx,A,C2,x)
= e(g1, g1)
λx (PK ′x)rx e(H2(GID), (PK ′′x )rxg
ωx
1 )
e(g
s2Hx2 (IDx )
1 H2(GID)
Hx2 (IDc)H2(IDAA1 ), g
rx
1 )
× e(H2(IDAA1 ), g
rx
1 g
ωx
1 )
e(g
s2Hx2 (IDx )
1 H2(GID)
Hx2 (IDx )H2(IDAA1 ), g
rx
1 )
= e(g1, g1)
λx e(H2(GID), (PK ′′x )rxg
ωx
1 )e(H2(IDAA1 ), g
rx
1 g
ωx
1 )
e(H2(GID)Hx2 (IDx )H2(IDAA1 ), g
rx
1 )
= e(g1, g1)
λx e(H2(GID), g
ωx
1 )e(H2(IDAA1 ), g
rx
1 g
ωx
1 )
e(H2(IDAA1 ), g
rx
1 )
= e(g1, g1)λx e(H2(GID), g1)ωx e(H2(IDAA1 ), g1)ωx
C1,be(H2(GIDA),C4,bC2,b)
e(SK ′b,A,C2,b)e(H (GIDA),C3,b)
= e(g1, g1)
λb (PK ′b)rbe(H2(GIDA), (PK ′′b )rbg
ωb
1 g
rb
1 )
e(g
s1Hx1 (IDb)
1 H2(GIDA)
Hx1 (IDb), grb1 )e(H (GIDA), g
rb
1 g
ωb
1 )
= e(g1, g1)
λbe(g1, g1)s1Hx1 (IDb)rbe(H2(GIDA), g
Hx1 (IDb)rb
1 g
ωb
1 g
rb
1 )
e(g1, g1)s1Hx1 (IDb)rbe(H2(GIDA), g
Hx1 (IDb)rb
1 g
rb
1 g
ωb
1 )
= e(g1, g1)λb
C1,ce(H2(GIDB),C4,cC2,c)
e(SK ′c,B,C2,c)e(H (GIDB),C3,c)
= e(g1, g1)
λb (PK ′c)rce(H2(GIDB), (PK ′′c )rcg
ωc
1 g
rc
1 )
e(g
s2Hx2 (IDc)
1 H2(GIDB)
Hx2 (IDc), grc1 )e(H (GIDB), g
rc
1 g
ωc
1 )
= e(g1, g1)
λce(g1, g1)s2Hx2 (IDc)rbe(H2(GIDB), g
Hx2 (IDc)rc
1 g
ωc
1 g
rc
1 )
e(g1, g1)s2Hx2 (IDc)rce(H2(GIDB), g
Hx2 (IDc)rc
1 g
rc
1 g
ωc
1 )
= e(g1, g1)λc
{a, b} and {c, d} respectively, and the access structure on C is
set to {b AND c} = {admin AND finance}, we explain how
users A and B decrypt C successfully as follow.
1) Firstly, users A and B modify their attribute secret keys
as such:
SK ′b,A = SKb,A/H2(IDAA1 )
= gs1Hx1 (IDb)1 H2(GIDA)Hx1 (IDb)
SK ′c,B = SKc,B/H2(IDAA2 )
= gs2Hx2 (IDc)1 H2(GIDB)Hx2 (IDc)
where GIDA = IDAA1 ||IDA and GIDB = IDAA2 ||IDB.
2) The ciphertext C is the same as in Step 5 of Section III-
A except x ∈ {b, c}.
3) User A extracts e(g1, g1)λb as shown at the top of this
page.
4) While user B extracts e(g1, g1)λc as shown at the top of
this page.
5) Lastly, they compute M such that:
C0∏
x
(
e(g1, g1)λx
)cx = Me(g1, g1)se(g1, g1)λbcb+λccc
= Me(g1, g1)
s
e(g1, g1)s
= M
where
∑
x cxAxv = s for the constants cx ∈ ZN .
IV. SECURITY FIXES
We discover that Yang et al.’s D-MA-ABE scheme shares a
lot similarities to Lewko and Waters’ Multi-Authority CP-
ABE (MA-CP-ABE) scheme [2]. Comparing to Lewko and
Waters’ scheme, Yang et al.’s AA has an additional public
key element PKa; ciphertext has an additional element C3,x ;
attribute secret key SKi,u has an additional element H2(IDAA)
in it. It seems that these additional elements weaken the
original scheme and lead to the two attacks above.
The key-only attack is caused by the lacking of authen-
tication mechanism in the key issuing protocol. A quick
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solution is to adopt a pairing-based proof of knowledge (PoK)
protocol as the key issuing protocol instead of designing from
scratch as done in [5]. PoK protocol provides authentication
but not non-repudiation and it is suitable for the purpose
of key issuing protocol here. The former allows the AAs to
authenticate each other while the latter provides additional
protection layer for user privacy as an AA can repudiate that
itself as well as the underlying users are involved in the key
issuing protocol. On the other hand, the collusion attack is
resulted from the additional ciphertext component C3,x . The
solution is to remove this element and the H2(IDAA) element
in SKi,u to adopt the secure decryption algorithm from Lewko
and Waters’ MA-CP-ABE.
Therefore, the complete solution is to extend Lewko and
Waters’ MA-CP-ABE scheme as suggested above to enable
the key issuing mechanism, so that users can remain private
to the AAs outside the domain as needed by a D-MA-ABE
scheme. It remain as an open problem to tell whether a
D-MA-ABE scheme can be trivially obtained from the com-
bination of a MA-ABE scheme and a PoK protocol, or
Yang et al.’s D-MA-ABE scheme is only a special case.
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